

Korea's International Development Cooperation and Civil Society Partnership : on the Factors Limiting the Growth of Civil Society Organizations*

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Ⅰ 차례 Ⅰ

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• Abstract •

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the faltering growth and participation of Korean civil society in international development cooperation policy area. Korea joined the OECD's Development Assistance Committee and legislated the Law on International Development Cooperation, and has emphasized the principle of Private-Public Partnerships. However, due to the lack of experience and institutional foundations in the ODA sector, the participation of civil society has been lacking compared to advanced donor states. This paper argues that the causes stem from the structural factors caused by the origins of Korean civil society as a citizens movement, and the characteristics of civil society organizations themselves. The large number of religion based FBOs, the lack of expertise and experience, unstable finances and management have caused civil society organizations to pursue individual goals and funding, instead of strategically framing a common issue to develop reliability and promote community interests regarding international development cooperation, thus failing to garner support from various policy actors.

Key Words : International Development Cooperation, Civil Society, Private-Public Partnership, ODA, CSO

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I. Introduction

In 2010, Korea became the first nation in the world to transition from a recipient state to donor state when it joined the OECD's international development and cooperation wing, the Development Assistance Committee. In July of the same year, the Law on International Development Cooperation was brought into force. However, the execution of ODA policies is made possible only to central government agencies, local governments, and public entities, limiting the participation of civil society organizations. Civil society is currently criticizing the inefficiencies of the dual structure donor organizations, and is calling for strengthened roles for the 'International Development Cooperation Committee' and the participation of civil society experts in the policy process. The legislation on development cooperation includes a clause on 'Private-Public Partnership' and emphasizes participatory cooperation with civil society. However, actual practices do not include civil society in the process of agenda-setting and policymaking. Civil society can only participate in the actual execution of development aid, which is significantly different from the practices of advanced development aid nations.

The international community recognizes that the participation of civil society is a necessary factor for effective development aid¹⁾. In the 2008 Conference held in Accra, Ghana, 800 participants from 120 nations participated in the Civil Society Forum, and civil society was recognized as a independent and autonomous development cooperation entity equal to nations. The international solidarity of civil society was expanded in the 2011 4th High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Busan. The Forum agreed on ten evaluation indicators for global partnership, which show that international community is increasing promoting the participation

1) Recently, international development agencies such as OECD, UN, and World Bank utilize a term more comprehensive than NGO, referring to development organizations as CSO(Civil Society Organization). The OECD's citizen society report defines CSOs as " all non national, non market organizations working towards shared interests in the public sphere". This includes development NGOs as well as community based organizations, village organizations, womens groups, environmental, farmers', faith based, labor unions, co-ops, professional groups, chambers of commerce, research institutes, and non-profit media. The concept is similar to the CSO represented in the Accra Action Agenda. This paper will refer to NGOs are CSOs, unless the official title still includes the term NGO. ex)Korea NGO Council for Overseas Development Cooperation.

of civil society in policy. Recommendations by DAC consider both aid effectiveness and development effectiveness, while increasing the participation of policy actors. Because ODA policies have not produced actually effective results, international society has expanded the agenda from emphasizing the effectiveness of development aid to include human rights, gender, and environment. It also presented the new objective of creating an international development system between comprehensive policy actors, with the participation of civil society and private businesses. These international trends were influenced by efforts within advanced donor states to define institutional relationships with civil society and increase their roles within the international development aid system.

However, Korea lacks experience in ODA policy and establishing institutional foundations for aid, contributes less considering its economic output, and civil society participation is also deficient.²⁾ Korea only delivers 2% of its ODA through civil society³⁾, while advanced donor nations such as Norway and Sweden provide over 20% through civil societies, and out of the 24 member states of the OECD DAC, 19 states have ratios higher than 10%.⁴⁾ To join the ranks of internationally responsible advanced donor states, various civil societies and actors should participate more actively in its policymaking, and through this Korea can step with the ODA policy direction of the international community.

This paper will examine the causes for weak participation by civil society organizations in the ODA decision making process. Existing research on ODA and civil society either introduce the status of civil society, or compare the institutional participation of civil society

2) Since Korea is a recent member of the DAC, there is the perspective that low participation rates for civil society is only natural. However, advanced donor states such as Sweden and Canada have delivered ODA through development CSOs from 1960's, and these trends intensified in the 1980's when neoliberalism began to influence international development cooperation.

3) According to the 2012 OECD Peer Review on Korea, only 2% of the Korean governments' ODA budget for 2009 and 2010 were delivered through CSOs. DAC recommended that ODA delivery through CSOs be increased.

4) Jae hwan Hong, Research on Civil Society Cooperation Improvement in ODA Policy (Seoul : Korean Institute of Public Administration, 2011), ch.4. KOICA's international cooperation budget for research on improving civil society cooperation has increased from 1 billion won in 2001 to 5 billion in 2008 and 10 billion in 2011, but is significantly less compared to advanced donor states. Even this amount is being delivered to 88 projects in 31 different countries, which seriously reduces the effectiveness of this delivery. However, in the case of Northern European countries, the allocation of budgets and delivery of aid through CSOs account for 21% of the total budget for Sweden, and 20% for Norway.

in North European donor states, or describe the activities of international development NGOs.⁵⁾ This research, different from previous works, will examine the causes of weak civil society participation from a structural, agent-based perspective. It will contribute to constructively establishing a cooperative relationship between Korea's ODA policy and civil society.

This research will proceed in the following order. The second part discusses the theoretical background for discussing civil society participation in ODA policy from the perspective of international development aid. Connections to Weigle and Butterfield's theory on the emergence and characteristics of civil society will be made to understand why civil society began participating in international development. Theories of framing will be introduced to explain the strategic behavior of Korean civil society as a policy actor. The third chapter describes the current status and activities of Korean civil society and international development. The fourth part analyzes why civil society has faltered from a structural, historical development perspective, and from an agent-based, characteristic and strategy perspective. The fifth part will conclude the paper.

II. Theoretical Discussions

1. Classification of Previous Civil Society Theory

To discuss why civil society participation has faltered in Korea's international development aid, it is necessary to first examine the origins of civil society in Korea. There have been many efforts to analyze the factors related to the creation, formation, and reappearance of civil society organizations. Gamm and Putnam(2001) analyze the positive influence of

5) Tae-Kyoon Kim and Myung-Joon Park, "Governance Mechanisms to Mobilize Civil Society Organizations for International Development Cooperation: A Comparative Analysis of Japan and Germany and Its Implications for South Korea", *Civil Society and NGO*, Vol. 8, No. 2(2010); Chun Woo Lee, "International ODA trends and Korea's ODA Policy", *Industrial Economic Research*, Vol. 24, No. 2(2010) pp.777-808; Sang Gi Jin, "Korean ODA Structure Analysis : Comparative Analysis of Advanced Donor States", *Korean Public Administration Research*, Vol. 19, No. 2(2010), pp.103-131.

urbanization in the US on the formation of civil society organizations from 1840 to 1940.⁶⁾ There is also research on how democratization led to the reappearance of civil society.⁷⁾ Weigle and Butterfield(1992) systematically analyze the appearance of civil society through the stages of democratization in former Soviet Bloc Central European nations.⁸⁾ In the transition period from authoritarianism to democracy, a 'defensive civil society' operates in a highly limited area, or operates as an underground organization, or a secret group. This defensive underground civil society, when limited democratization measures are taken, become 'emergent civil society', introducing itself in the open political arena. However, continuing authoritarian influences lead the civil society organizations to struggle for institutional change by taking to the streets, becoming a 'mobilizing civil society'. Meanwhile civil society also cooperates with the opposition political party through election campaigns, and establishes a beachhead for becoming a part of institutionalized politics. Civil society in Korea appeared as a citizen's movement, so it may be argued that organizations with specific objectives such as international development cooperation should be approached from a different perspective. Existing discussions on development NGOs explained civil society as the balancer between market and state, emphasizing their community, solidarity, and volunteer work as social capital. From the market liberal's perspective, civil society performs better than government as a supplier of public services.⁹⁾ Michael Edwards(2004) argues that civil society organizations have a large role in the social, economic, and political development of developing states. Development NGOs demand responsibility and transparency from government organizations and international agencies on development aid, promoting good

6) Gerald Gamm and Robert D. Putnam, "The Growth of Voluntary Association in America, 1840-1940." in R. I. Rotberg (ed.), *Patterns of Social Capital: Stability and Change in Historical Perspective* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), ch.1-3.

7) Sun hyuk Kim, *21st Century Public Administration Paradigm and Education : Korean Association for Public Administration Summer Academic Conference*(Seoul: The Korean Association for Policy Studies, 2003), pp.2-7; Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe Schmitter, *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies*(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), ch.1-2.

8) Marcia A. Weigle and Jim Butterfield, "Civil Society in Reforming Communist Regimes: The Logic of Emergence." *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 25, No. 1(1992); Kim (2003), pp. 2-7; Hyung Baeg Im, "Revival and Development of Korean Civil Society", *The Journal of Social Paradigm Studies*, Vol. 24, No.1(2009), pp.137-169.

9) David Lewis and Nazneen Kanji, *Non-Governmental Organizations and Development* (NY: Routledge, 2009), ch. 1-3.

governance. Liberalist civil society theory states that civil society affinity with market and state secure financial support for development and provide support for developing nations. These approaches stress the purpose and role of civil society. However they are limited in explaining why Korea's civil society is relatively lacking in size and participation.

This paper will utilize Weigle and Butterfield(1992)'s concept of defensive, emergent, mobilizing, and institutional civil society to explain the development of civil society in Korea¹⁰⁾. The appearance and development of civil society in Korea is related to the structural limitations of civil society participation.

2. ODA Civil Society Organizations' Strategic Behavior : Framing Theory Approach

The reasons for low participation of CSOs in Korea is related not only to structural limitations, but also actor-based CSOs characteristics and strategies. Civil society should regularly communicate and cooperate with its supporters to achieve its goals, and act on the long term. This strategic behavior is made possible through the combination of language and technique, which is discourse.¹¹⁾ It is important to analyze how actors form their discourse and form relationships between actors.

This paper will utilize framing theory to analyze the power structure of discourse between actors to show why Korea's international development aid civil society failed in its strategic behavior. This part first introduces the approaches of framing theory.

Framing theory comprehensively analyzes how agents form discourse, and form relationships. Sohn, hyuk-Sang emphasized that framing takes place through discursive process, strategic process, and contested process, which overlap.¹²⁾

10)

11) The discursive process includes social movements and all related dialogue, stories, and documented communication

12) Sohn Hyuk-sang explains thoroughly why civil society organizations' aid effectiveness discourse did not become the dominant frame at the 2011 Forum through framing theory. Huk-Sang Sohn, "Framing Theory and Discourse Contestation of 'Aid Effectiveness' and 'Development Effectiveness'" in International Development Cooperation", The Korean Journal of International Studies, Vol. 53, No. 1(2013), p.15.

The discursive process includes the documented communication that takes place through narratives on a certain event. This is formed by interactive processes between frame articulation and frame application or punctuation. Frame articulation is the process by which the political support of the public is strengthened through experience and events. Frame amplification is the emphasizing of events, issues, and beliefs related to a certain frame, over other frames. Frames are reconstructed through continuous interactions between the agent and structure.

To understand the development of frames, the process of expanding and clarifying it should be examined in detail. The strategic process is a purposeful and planned process to garner political support to achieve a certain goal.

Sohn Hyuk Sang(2013:15-16) argues that enlargement of political support for a certain frame in the strategic process takes place in four steps. Frame bridging, which connects two or more related frames that have not been connected structurally, then frame extension, then frame transformation which changes old meanings and creates new meaning.

The competition between frames pursued by each actors should be given attention. Where many frames are contested, an efficient strategy is needed to become the dominant frame.

Benford and Snow introduce strategies for becoming the dominant frame.¹³⁾ The more comprehensive the frame, the more effective it is. The frame must concern itself with a large area for more agents to involve itself and mobilize more resources. The more flexible and trustworthy the frame, the more likely it is that it will become dominant. The reliability of the frame increases when the actions and words of the frame match, and real life events provide an empirical evidence for the frame.

For dominant frames to function as influential structures, it must go through discursive, strategic processes, as well as confrontation with other frames and competition, as Benford and Snow argue. The dominant frames that have emerged as norms and structures have been developed in the competitive process for frames. According to the role of the agents, frames can become dominant, or be weakened by competition, or replaced by another dominant frame.

In regard to Benford and Snow's strategy, Koreans' trust in civil society organizations is decreasing, and many organizations are structurally weak regarding citizen participation,

13) Robert D. Benford, "An Insider's Critique of the Social Movement Framing Perspective", *Sociology Inquiry*, Vol. 67, No. 4(1997), pp.611-639; Sohn(2013), p. 16.

institutional resources, policy influence, and citizens capabilities. Im Hyuk-Baeg's paper cites survey results from Joongangilbo to show that civil society has fallen from 1st to 5th place between 2003 and 2005 in the ranking amongst the most trusted societal organizations in Korea.¹⁴⁾ The 2005 and 2006 surveys by EAI and Joongangilbo show that the most important civil society organizations in Korea, People's Solidarity for Participatory Democracy(PSPD) and Citizens' Coalition for Economic Justice(CCEJ) is losing influence and trust. The structural weakness of Korean civil society stems from weak membership basis and lack of financial, human resources. Despite civil society organizations being recognized as independent donor organizations in the 2008 Accra conference, Korean civil society has not established an institutional status for itself.

Ⅲ. Current Status of Korean International Development Cooperation CSO

1. Size and Characteristics

The number of Korean CSOs can be found in the Korea NGO Council for Overseas Development Cooperaton(CODC)¹⁵⁾'s registered members list. There are 118 organizations in 2014, but the estimated total is 170, including unregistered groups.

According to the survey by the CODC, the total number of employees at civil society organizations were 90,490. Of these, 80,471 people, or 89%, were unpaid volunteers. 46% of organizations had less than 10 employees, 10 to 20 employees 21%, and 20 to 50 employees 15%. Only 4% had 1,000 members or more. The staff in charge of overseas operations amounted to 2,389, of which 76%, 1,819 people were unpaid volunteers.¹⁶⁾ This shows the small-scale nature of development CSOs in Korea.

14) Im(2009), p.148.

15) Korea NGO Council for Overseas Development Cooperaton, formerly known as Overseas Aid Council

16) http://www.ngokcoc.or.kr/society/society7_2.php(Search date: 2018. 12. 11) Out of the 168 organizations operating in developing nations, 87 responded to the survey.

Development CSOs in Korea can be divided into six groups.¹⁷⁾ First is the transition from foreign relief aid group to development aid, such as World Vision and UNICEF Korea commission. Second are organizations disseminating Korea's poverty elimination experience overseas, such as the Planned Population Federation of Korea, Korea Association of Health Promotion, and the Saemaueul Movement. Third are religious groups, Christian and Buddhist. Fourth are indigenous development NGOs, Good Neighbours, COPION, and Global Civic Sharing. Fifth are professional-based groups, medical organizations such as Korean Medicine Volunteers, and Global Care. Sixth are existing civil society organizations performing development aid operations, such as Korea YMCA, Blue Asia, and Northeast Asian Peace Cooperation. Some social welfare foundations have expanded its operations overseas, such as Heart Heart Foundation, Korea Help Age. But it is difficult to classify member NGOs into a single category. For example, organizations acting as foreign relief aid groups turned development aid organizations exhibit characteristics of FBO(Faith-based Organization)s. Many organizations were not created for operating overseas, but have expanded their territory while carrying out domestic missions. Overall, religion based CSOs are most common, and a large number have taken up development aid by expanding its operations overseas.

2. Budget and Operations

The total budget of development cooperation CSOs in Korea has increased from 300 billion won to 1.164.9 trillion won between 2005 and 2009. Domestic operations take up 52% of the budget with 606.5 billion won invested and foreign operations 28% with 320.5 billion won. Even considering that many registered CSOs carry out both domestic and foreign operations, the proportion of foreign operations is relatively low.

Educational operations take up the biggest share of operations, with 30%, or 384 educational operations out of a total of 1,249. Health and medical programmes account for 23% with 303, and regional development 11% with 148. Policy advocacy programmes numbered only 25, 2% of the total.¹⁸⁾

17) Jae Kwang Han, Civil Society Movements and Development NGO Dialogue and Cooperation (Seoul: ODA Watch Letter 22 OWL's view, 2010), p.53.

18) 2011 Korea International Development Cooperation CSO Registry.

Korean development CSOs focus 84% of their educational operations in the Asia-Pacific region, and the other 16% in the Middle East and Africa, showing a concentration in a small number of Asian nations.

IV. Analysis on the Factors of Lack in Growth

1. Structural Causes : History of Korean Civil Society, International Development CSOs and their limiting factors

Korean civil society emerged as a key player in the democratization movement that drove out authoritarian government. After the collapse of the Yushin(Revitalizing Reform) system in 1979, another military takeover reintroduced authoritarian government in Korea. Korean civil society was limited to a 'defensive civil society', operating according to what was permitted by the military government, or hiding itself underground. However, when the Chun Doo Hwan government introduced limited liberalization policies, an 'emergent civil society' reappeared. Civil society expanded its ranks and underground organizations appeared in the political space. Farmers, poor tenants, teachers, professors, journalists, religious leaders, and artists would all form their communities, and social movements formed national coalitions. The general elections on February 12th, 1985 marked the beginning of 'mobilized civil society'. The revitalized Korean civil society realized that it would not achieve its goals within the authoritarian system, and took to the streets in order to bring about regime change. In the 1985 elections civil society actively supported the opposition party and established a bipartisan system, securing a foothold in institutionalized politics. The authoritarian governments' refusal to amend the constitution on April 13th provided an opportunity to involve the previously hesitant middle class in the 'street parliament'. In June of 1987, a coalition by the absolute majority for democratization was formed, and in addition to the existing student and laborer movements, teachers, professors, journalists, religious leaders, artists, doctors, and lawyers formed a moral civil society.

After democratization and the loosening of state control over civil society, interest groups to protect their occupational, religious, and regional interests began to form. With the growth of these autonomous interest groups, Korean civil society saw qualitative development, increase in independence, and developed into an institutional civil society. In the mid 1990's the autonomy of the civil society began to increase. During the authoritarian era, Korean government sought to control civil society by demobilizing and disorganizing it. The government atomized and particularized civil society to form state to individual relationships instead of state to organization, and imposed legal and financial penalties to control them. These state sponsored organizations began to recover their autonomy after democratization.¹⁹⁾ They began to elect their representatives democratically and moved away from government control. In the authoritarian era civil society was limited to a resistance based mobilized civil society and state sponsored civil society. After democratization, an institutionalized civil society to promote public interests in the public sphere emerged. Realization of economic justice, solidarity for citizen participation, environmental protection, womens rights, social welfare, media watch, consumer rights, and election observation were among the objectives of the organizations formed.²⁰⁾ Civil society organizations related to international development rapidly increased in number during this period. Following the successful democratization in 1987, the radical agenda of the mobilized civil society was transferred to institutional civil society, providing an alternate channel for representing citizens interests. The growth of civil society after democratization is closely related to government policies managing civil society. The Roh Tae Woo and Kim Young Sam governments restricted radical and class-oriented civil society, but promoted moderate middle class organizations. The Kim administration financially supported institutional civil society. The 'non profit civil organization support act' increased the level of support, promoted

19) Ho-Geun Song, *Korea's Social Democratization : State-Citizen Relations*. Political Democratization and Social Democratization's Dynamic Relationship; International Comparative Research (Kangwon: Hanlim University Social Research Institute, 1996); Hee Yeon Jo, *Civil Society Movement and Politics : Korean Politics and NGOs Politics Reform Movement*. Civil Society Forum, Joongangilbo Civil Society Research. Civil Society for Participatory Democracy(Seoul; Arche, 2002), ch.1-2.

20) Kyoung Ryung Seong, "Civil Society and Democratic Consolidation in South Korea: great Achievement and Remaining Problems", in Larry Diamond and Byung Kook Kim(eds.), *Consolidating Democracy in South Korea*(Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2000), ch.1-3.; Im(2009), pp.137-169.

cooperation between government and civil society, delegated power, and for the first time in Korean history the government accepted civil society as a partner for national governance.²¹⁾

Korea's development CSOs began active operations in the 1990's. Of the 66 organizations registered in the Foreign Aid Council, 28 were established during this period. In 1994 Good Neighbors and Famine Relief sent aid workers during the Rwandan civil war, which marked the beginning of international development cooperation by Korean CSOs. During this period religion based organizations were formed as well. Professional organizations also established their development CSOs and carried out international aid. The government agency KOICA began supporting development CSOs from this period. KOICA has provided 489 million won in support for 19 civil society organizations since 1995.

Korean CSOs gradually grew during the 2000's compared to the past. A number of disasters and conflicts, from the 2001 Afghanistan war, 2004 Iraqi war, 2004 South Asia tsunami, to the 2005 Pakistan earthquake, and a large number of CSOs participated in relief and reconstruction. Development CSOs operating in disaster and war zones were introduced in media, and citizens were made aware of these organizations. 15 development cooperation and civilian consultative organizations were formed during this period, most of which were FBO groups. Legal experts established Advocate Korea, and international development groups were formed as well. During this period, the occurrence of international conflicts, the appointment of UN secretary general Ban, the popularization of overseas volunteer work, interest in ODA issues, membership in the OECD/DAC, and interest in international organizations led to growth in development CSOs. This social atmosphere was reflected in government policy, and KOICA increased support for NGOs, where 489 million won had been provided for 19 organizations in 1995, the amount of support provided increased twelve-fold and number of organizations support four-fold by 2009. In 2012, KOICA provides 26.1 billion won for 160 projects in 37 different countries. However, support for NGOs account for 1% of total Korean ODA. As it can be seen in Table 1, 26.1 billion KRW is being used to support 160 projects in 37 countries.

21) See Hyung Baeg Im(2009), pp.137-169 for the emergence of civil society in Korea, The author focuses on the neo-nomadic characteristics of modern Korean civil society.

〈Table 1〉 KOICA CSO Support Trend(2004–2012) (Unit Million Won)

	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
Amount	1,000	2,799	3,937	5,166	6,614	6,679	6,988	13,969	26,153
Supported Country	15	19	17	19	28	27	33	34	37
Supported Program	21	41	29	42	75	74	84	119	160

Source : <http://stat.koica.go.kr/> (Visited: 2018. 12. 11.) by author

Since KOICA began supporting CSOs in 1995, attempts to create cooperative projects with civil society are continuously being pursued. However, compared to advanced donor states, the budget for supporting CSOs in development aid is lacking.

For example, states traditionally classified as advanced donor countries, Sweden and Norway, are among the countries with the highest GNI to ODA ratios. These countries also have independent institutions, NORAD and SIDA, implementing ODA policies. They also have high percentages of budgets being delivered through CSOs. The table<2-3> belows show the allocation of budgets according to the type of ODA cooperation organization, and show that Sweden dedicates 21%, and Norway 20% to CSOs.

〈Table 2 〉Allocation of Sweden's ODA per cooperative entity, 2013

Cooperating Entity	Multilateral Organization	Donor Government	International NGO	National NGO	Recipient NGO	Other
Budget Allocation	55%	12%	10%	8%	3%	12%

Source: Openaid, “Who implements the aid?”

〈Table 3 〉Allocation of Sweden's ODA per cooperative entity, 2013

Cooperating Entity	Multilateral Organization	Recipient Government	Donor Government	Inter-national NGO	National NGO	Recipient NGO	Civilian-Government Cooperation
Budget Allocation	44%	17%	15%	7%	13%	3%	1%

Source : NORAD, “Norwegian Development Aid 2013 by Partner”

The Swedish and Norwegian governments implement their policies with clear objectives and vision, organizing educational programmes to improve national awareness on international development aid across the nation. they also drew the voluntary support of citizens by financially supporting civil societies organizations in recipient countries that are optimized for development projects. On the other hand, Korea allocates only 2% of its ODA budget to CSOs, and even this is divided between more than 80 projects, raising questions on its effectiveness. This is because the government only sought to attain the international society's recommended level of ODA budget without providing a specific action plan, and because of policy promotion and education that did not take release transparent information on ODAs. Without an independent government organization for ODA such as the Swedish and Norwegian institutes, a number of ministries including the Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Foreign Affairs were involved as stakeholders in the process, which resulted in the lack of a responsible and independent management entity for policy.

Thus, Korean civil society emerged as a movement to realize democratization under an authoritarian government. It was only able to be recognized within the institutional system in the late 1990's, and they have a short history of operations and experience. Because of these reasons, while the advanced donor states were able to accumulate experience and knowhow in the early days of ODA policy implementation starting in the 1960-70's²²⁾ Korean CSOs are limited in their expertise and ability to carry out effective aid delivery due to structural difficulties and their short history.

2. Agent-based Factors

1) Agent Characteristics

The most distinctive characteristic of Korean development CSOs is religiousness. Christianity based organizations were prominent, reflecting the emphasis on evangelism,

22) Germany and Sweden began providing government development aid to NGOs in 1962, Austria, Netherlands and Norway in 1965, and Canada in 1968. The development NGOs of Europe and Canada established the EURO ACTION ACCORD in 1973-1974 for disaster relief in developing nations, and united NGO organizations in similar vein were established. During this period, some advanced donor states began ODA assistance through development NGOs, Chae Hyung Kim, OECD Member States' NGO Activity : focusing on development aid(Seoul: Korea Foundation Research, 1992), pp.13-18.

and Korea internationalization experience.²³⁾

Religion based organizations in international development cooperation are denominated FBOs(Faith-based Organization). FBOs are defined by UNAIDS as CSOs influenced by religion. Korean development CSOs that are based on religious beliefs, composed of religious citizens and experts, established by religious personnel, have definite religious statements in their mission and official documents that carry out relief, development, education, and advocacy activities can be defined as FBOs. Using these standards, a research defines 65% of development CSOs in Korea to be FBOs and 35% to be non-FBO (Han Jae Gwang 2010:23.)²⁴⁾ Foreign aid organizations and missionary institutes formed after the Korean War can be considered early FBOs. In the 1960's organizations to solve population and health issues were established, and in the 1970's university based international interaction and missionary organizations were formed. In the 1980's these FBOs began to engage in international development. Institute of Asian Culture and Development, Northeast Asia Foundation for Education and Culture, and Sunny Korea Welfare Foundation are Christian organizations. The 1990's also saw a large number of FBOs being established. Good People, East and West Cultural Exchange Foundation, World Neighbors, Well International, Team and Team are christian institutions, but there are also buddhist institutions such as Korea JTS and Help for African Children. These religious characteristics continued into the 2000's, with the christian Cannan Farmer's Movement, Serving Friends International, and World Together, and buddhist Lotus World, Goodhands, and Chungsu Sharing Group being established.²⁵⁾

23) Previous research states that education and health projects by missionaries in the late 19th century influenced Korean NGOs. Jae Kwang Han, Significance of Korea's Admission to DAC and HLF Hosting and Tasks(Seoul: Korea Association of International Development and Cooperation, 2010), pp.3-28.

24) The 35%, which are non faith based organizations, are mostly women's rights, environmental, and human rights organizations that are small in size. They cannot realistically compete with well financed religious organizations with a large number of memberships, and cannot participate in their area of expertise. Also, a large number of NGOs utilize christian missionaries in the recipient states due to their familiarity with local cultures, customs, and networks. However, these missionaries lack expertise on matters of development aid. Han(2010), p.23.

25) Recently other religious institutes and medical professionals are diversifying the ranks of development NGOs, but their numbers are small. Welfare organizations and FBOs tend to be conservative, and has a large impact on their operations. their programmes tend to remain at providing services, lacking in fundamental and structural approaches (Jae Kwang Han, Civil Society Movements and Development NGO Dialogue and Cooperation(Seoul: ODA Watch Letter 22, OWL's view, 2010), pp.3-8.

Korea, despite having less experience with humanitarianism compared to European states, saw a rapidly increase in CSO activities because of the religiousness in Korean society. However, excessive religiousness becomes a problem for development CSOs. In the presentation by Lee Joo Young on 'Religious CSOs and international volunteer work : Christian CSOs missionary work' at the UNESCO Youth Forum, Korean Christian CSOs were criticized as using development aid for evangelical purposes, hindering the activities of other CSOs by interacting only with other Christians, and creating conflict within the local communities.²⁶⁾ Because Korea's international development organizations have a large proportion of religious organizations, they tend to have specific goals rather than pursue effective development, and cannot cooperate well with other expert CSOs.

Another characteristic of Korean CSOs is financial instability and the lack of expertise. Civil society organizations began receiving government support in 1995 from KOICA. However, as Table 4 shows, international development cooperation organizations only receive 15.7% of their budget from government sources, and small inexperienced groups do not receive much government support. Even though KOICA provides an equal opportunity for CSOs to participate, it is difficult for inexperienced organizations to operate in its field.²⁷⁾ Gender, environmental, human rights CSOs must apply for the same programme as other CSOs, making the process difficult.

〈Table 4〉 2011 Korea NGO Council for Overseas Development Cooperation Members' Budgetary Makeup (Unit : 100 million won)

Classification		Amount	Proportion
Donation	Individual	3,924	38.6%
	Business	1,522	15.0%
Government		1,589	15.7%
Miscellaneous		3,118	30.7%
Total		10,153	100%

Source : 2011 Korea NGO Council for Overseas Development Cooperation Current Operations Status²⁸⁾, by Author

26) Joo-Young Lee, Religious NGOs and International Volunteer Work : Christian NGOs Evangelical Activities (2nd UNESCO Youth Forum, 2007), pp.72-74; Han (2010), p.24.

27) Korean development CSOs are receiving increasing support and interest since the 1990's, and are demanding increased funding from government. However, government officials have expressed concern over the effectiveness of CSOs and the increasing budgetary support in informal occasions. Only a small number of CSOs with long histories and large organizations can carry out development projects effectively

2) Agents' Framing Strategy

For the dominant frame to function as an influential structure, it must go through Benford and Snow's discourse process, strategic process, and competition with other frames. Dominant frames in international relations, norms, institutions, and regimes have all formed and developed in a contested process of frames. Depending on the agents' roles frames may become dominant or weaken and be replaced by other frames.

International civil society organizations on development cooperation are carrying out active framing strategies through policy research, lobbying, advocacy, and campaign. Development cooperation international civil society is debating over the following three contested issues. First is the direction of development CSOs as an alternative actor for development. Civil society is moving beyond simply development and searching for alternative measures. Second is the effectiveness of CSOs. Civil society participated actively in the preparation and execution of the 2008 Accra Conference. Civil society organizations actively formed supranational networks during the conference and established the ISG (International CSO Steering Group). 800 CSOs participated to discuss aid effectiveness in the Third Forum on Aid Effectiveness. They engaged in strategic framing to better advance their demands regarding effectiveness. The discussion was led by the Advisory Group on Civil Society and Aid Effectiveness(AG-CS).²⁹⁾

International civil society called into question the issue of development effectiveness, going beyond aid effectiveness, and led the debate on the issue. The open forum held in Brussels 2007 presented 6 principles regarding CSO development effectiveness. First is human centrality; CSO activities should empower individuals and regional communities, strengthen democratic ownership and participation. Second, CSO activities should be poverty focused. Third, CSO activities should be based on human rights and social justice. Fourth, CSO activities should be sincere, based on long term partnerships, and accept diversity and

28) http://www.ngokcoc.or.kr/society/society7_2.php(Search date: 2018. 12. 20)

29) AG-GS was established in 2007 by CSOs and government agencies, for the purpose of providing an opportunity for civil society to involve itself in the 2008 Accra Conference. AG-GS contributed to forming the 20 principles in the Accra Agenda for Action, reflecting the voice of CSOs. AG-CS is continuing its operations in the Open Forum for CSO Development Effectiveness (Hye Kyung Kim, Time for Korean NGOs to Advance(Seoul: ODA Watch Letter 33, OWL's View, 2009), pp. 33-34; Han(2010), p.45.

dialogue. Fifth, CSO activities should be based on social processes and mutual learning, striving for sustainable results. Sixth, CSOs should continuously improve transparency, responsibility, autonomy, and harmony with other actors to secure its effectiveness. International civil society is producing alternative discourse for the purpose of increasing international development cooperation effectiveness. They are carrying out two different types of movements, one is raising questions on the current system for development assistance. Another is improving the effectiveness of civil society, objectively and comprehensively measuring the effectiveness of civil societies, strategically framing it to appear as self-motivated improvements. These shows of responsibility contribute towards long-term reliability of the civil society organization.

However, Korean development NGOs could not participate actively in the alternative discourse and strategic framing of the international community. 1990's were the time when Korean CSOs increased development assistance efforts. However, Koreans did not participate much at international conferences on economic justice.³⁰⁾ Absolute poverty in Africa and South Asia, famine, disease, increasing the capacity of local populations and civil society, and improving the effectiveness of government aid were mainly discussed, but Korean civil society was more concerned with domestic issues. This is an innate weakness for Korean civil society, which began as a citizen's movement. There is a lack of communication and cooperation with CSOs for improving development aid policy. A strategic framing involving government, business, and civil society is required, moving beyond simple government ODA. The issue should be a shared one, not a specific agenda for a certain group. The main demands of civil society in Korea focus on financial demands to increase one's organization, and FBOs tend to focus on evangelical goals, which has resulted in a failure to create a comprehensive framing. Korean development CSOs have focused more on delivering services such as relief and development, instead of fundamental issues such as development cooperation policy. Most individual CSOs are not experienced and not interested in policy movements through strategic framing, and there are not many cases of individual organizations engaging in policy advocacy to bring about legal, institutional change in government policy. CSOs have been interested only in securing CSO share in ODA. Individual groups tend to pursue their own interests, instead of uniting for the benefit of the community. The CCEJ's ODA

30) Kim(2009), p.35.

Watch and PSPD's international solidarity committee are leading the movement by release statements, publishing reports, hosting forums, and distributing policy newsletters. However, they lack expertise in approaching the issue and providing alternatives. Korea's international development cooperation organizations should adopt a long term outlook and strategically approach legal and institutional policy changes in development cooperation.

For a certain frame to become dominant, the frame must be reliable and professional. However, civil society in Korea is lacking an experience, resources, and expertise compared to government and business. Also, the movements and demands of civil society are focused on the quantitative growth of their own organizations. Some development NGOs are not participating in the global trends, but focusing on donation efforts and promoting their own activities. There are realistic difficulties to making the civil society's frame into a frame widely agreed upon by policy actors. The lower the agents' empirical reliability, the lower the trustworthiness of the frame. Compare to the dominant frames put forward by multilateral aid agencies and donor states, civil society frames are less reliable. For development CSOs to systematically strategize its agenda, flexible framing strategies should be undertaken, encompassing global social justice, environmental protection, and climate change action. These are necessary requirements for the growth of development CSOs in Korea.

V. Conclusion

The paper has analyzed the structural and agent based causes behind the faltering quantitative and qualitative growth of development CSOs in Korea when compared to advanced donor states. The emergence and development of Korean civil society was examined using Weigle and Butterfields' four concepts of civil society. Korean civil society has focused on domestic issues such as democratization, human rights, womens rights, environmental protection, and labor issues. When Korean civil society attempted to operate in international development cooperation, it has faced lack of experience, expertise, and interest. Civil society stemming from citizens' movements caused them to be structurally limited and lacking in professionalism.

From the agent-based perspective, the large number for FBOs amongst Korean CSOs and small-scale organizations hinder efforts to create a strategic frame where many groups can unite. This is related to the failure to establish a reliable network due to the lack of expertise and experience. Development CSOs require comprehensive and flexible strategic framing to advance their interests in the long term. Korea's development CSOs need to collectively create issues and involve various actors and supporters. This is a necessary condition for the growth and increase participation in Korean CSOs in the area of international development cooperation.

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• 국문초록 •

한국의 국제개발협력과 시민사회 파트너십 : 시민사회단체의 성장제약요인을 중심으로

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이 논문의 목적은 국제개발협력 정책 분야에서 한국 시민사회단체의 참여와 성장이 부진한 원인을 분석하는 데 있다. 한국은 2010년 OECD 개발원조위원회 가입과 국제개발협력기본법의 발효를 통해 국제개발협력 정책이행과정에서 시민사회와의 협력을 강조하는 민관파트너십(Private-public partnership)의 원칙을 강조하고 있다. 하지만 한국은 여전히 ODA 분야에서의 경험부족과 미흡한 제도기반으로 인해 다른 선진 공여국들에 비해 시민단체의 참여가 부진하다. 이 글은 그 원인을 시민운동으로 시작된 한국 시민사회의 기원과 제한적인 발전과정, 시민단체 자체의 특징, 즉 종교성에 기반한 다수의 FBO의 존재와 경험과 전문성 부족 및 취약한 재정과 운영력 등의 구조적 요인으로 보았다. 이와 같은 구조적 한계가 시민단체들로 하여금 국제개발협력이라는 공동체 이익을 도모할 수 있는 포괄적이고 신뢰감 있는 공동의 이슈화와 전략적 프레이밍을 불가능하게 했다. 나아가 개별단체의 특정목표와 재정보호라는 편협한 프레이밍은 다양한 행위자들과 지지자들을 포섭하는 데 장애로 작용했다.

주제어 : 국제개발협력, 시민사회, 민관파트너십, ODA, CSO

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